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Two traditions of development 
assistance began to take root after the 
end of the Second World War and the 
emergence of ‘the Third World’ from 
a frequently painful decolonisation 
process. One was centred around the 
OECD led by its Development 
Assistance Committee, the 
International Finance Institutions and a 
host of accompanying processes and 
stakeholders – sometimes described 
as ‘the aid industry’. The other 
was centred around the non- 
Alignment Movement and South-
South Cooperation principles initially 
formulated at the Bandung Conference 
in 1955. These two approaches 
remained a broadly parallel set of 
processes and relationships until two 
important developments: the end of 
the Cold War and the rapid economic 
growth of East Asian economies. 
China’s growth in particular challenged 
many of the fundamental principles of 
DAC-informed development, but it 
was not the only country which did not 
adopt the Western model. BRIC foreign 
ministers first began to meet on the 
sidelines of the UN General Assembly 
in 2006, building on an established 
series of RIC meetings (Russia, India, 
China). Leader meetings followed and 
the first full BRIC Summit was 
organised by Russia in 2009. Soon 
after, South Africa was invited to join 
the BRIC to make the BRICS in 2010. 
What is the significance of the 
BRICS Summits for a transitioning 
global economic governance?
The BRICS Summit is most accurately 
viewed as a group of non-G7 
countries providing themselves with a 
forum where they do not have to 
contend for air-time and agenda-
setting with Western powers and 
intellectual frameworks, and which 
provides the possibility to have an 
impact –symbolically, rhetorically and 
programmatically – on the world scene. 
The eThekwini Leader’s Declaration, 
from the 5th BRICS Summit held in 
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The sustained growth of rising powers, including the grouping known as the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is reshaping global 
governance arrangements. Annual BRICS summits and inter-ministerial 
meetings seek to reform existing international financial and economic 
institutions and promote a multipolar system of global order. The BRICS are 
also gaining prominence amongst ‘emerging donors’, building on a tradition of 
South-South development cooperation, which has grown outside the framework 
of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. As Southern donors become 
major players, and with the potentially significant role of a new BRICS 
Development Bank, what might a polycentric international development system 
look like and what are the policy implications?
“China’s growth 
challenged 
many of the 
fundamental 
principles of 
the DAC 
development 
model.”
Durban in March 2013, sets out the objective of 
‘progressively developing the BRICS into a full-
fledged mechanism of current and long-term 
coordination on a wide range of key issues of 
the world economy and politics’.
Within the framework of the Summit process 
led by heads of state, the BRICS have also from 
2011 created a series of regular inter-ministerial 
meetings in key areas of concern: health, 
finance, agriculture, education and 
urbanisation. The BRICS Summits are emerging 
as a knowledge-exchange process among 
countries still classed as developing, but 
looking to a future world order in which they 
have major roles and responsibilities. 
Alongside their deepening collaboration, the 
BRICS are all also fully committed to the G20 
Leaders process, itself a manifestation of the 
evolving global governance system. Along with 
a wide range of developing countries, all of 
the BRICS also engage in substantive 
engagement and joint work within the OECD 
and participate in OECD annual ministerial 
meetings. Hence, the BRICS Summit process 
could be said to be nested within a larger 
process of systemic change in global 
governance. Even if the pace and nature of any 
such change cannot at this point be foreseen, 
ultimately this process will produce convergence 
between the BRICS and DAC models, albeit 
with challenge and contestation.
The G20 and the BRICS are both self-selected 
groupings of countries with divergent 
interests and governance systems. Values and 
reputation are critical to credibility in both 
these arenas. It is on this level that failure to 
generate a strong recovery from financial 
crisis sparked by difficulties and dysfunctions 
in Western governance systems has opened 
the way for the BRICS to come forward as 
global leaders. Yet, as we see, the BRICS also 
face their own range of economic and 
governance challenges. The way in which they 
respond to and manage these challenges 
affects their reputation and soft power, both 
individually and collectively. 
The BRICS Summits are the only global process 
with an explicit objective to constitute a new 
global order in line with the massive change in 
economic weight that is coming in the next 
decade. The stated objective of the BRICS is to 
ensure that this coming world order is inclusive 
and just, in line with historic South-South 
principles for a post-colonial world order, and 
with the United Nations as the centre of 
systemic legitimacy. 
Yet while the BRICS Summits look to project 
the voice of the global South, there are 
divergent interests and priorities among the 
BRICS, for example, on reform of the UN 
Security Council. There are even some ongoing 
disputes on territorial boundaries, for example, 
between China and India. Difficult frontlines 
with the international economic system also 
occur in the areas of currency management and 
trade. Here the BRICS Summit process will be 
tested as its members confront their 
differentiated interests in and responsibilities for 
the functioning of the global system.
The BRICS Bank: a new contender in 
development finance?
The official announcement at the 2013 BRICS 
Summit in Durban of the formation of a joint 
development bank was a significant milestone 
with regard to the future of development 
cooperation. There is little question that the 
project has a signalling as much as a practical role, 
challenging the pre-eminent position of the 
World Bank as the reference point for leadership, 
governance and practice of development and 
multilateral development finance. 
In a global macroeconomic context of a major 
shortfall in investment spending, there is a huge 
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“The stated 
objective of the 
BRICS is to 
ensure that the 
coming world 
order is inclusive 
and just, in line 
with historic 
South-South 
principles for a 
post-colonial 
world order.”
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“The existence of 
the national 
development 
banks and the 
Interbank 
Cooperation 
Mechanism 
provides a pool 
of experience 
and capacity on
which the New 
Development 
Bank can draw.”
unrealised demand for new and renewed 
infrastructure. Altering the state of long-term 
expectations of investment in developed and 
developing countries would do much to fix the 
lagging recovery from the financial crisis, as well 
as provide the scope to speed up green 
economic transformations around the world. 
The urgent need to scale up long-term finance 
is common ground across the G20, where 
tackling the policy and market failures that stand 
in the way of generating long-term funding for 
infrastructure is a declared priority for the 
Australian G20 Presidency in 2014.
The G20 work shows the need for both a 
supply of bankable projects and a stream of 
long-term finance as interdependent elements 
of a scaled up infrastructure investment system 
that will yield long-term income streams for 
savers such as pensions funds and sovereign 
wealth funds. In principle, the World Bank and 
the regional development banks could be 
quickly mobilised to effect such a major 
scale-up in developing countries, but the 
political consensus to do so would be extremely 
difficult to organise. 
The BRICS have been able to generate a 
consensus on a New Development Bank 
around an Indian initiative launched at the 
New Delhi BRICS Summit in 2012. The 
announced aim is to have the whole 
institutional design ready for agreement at 
the Brazil BRICS Summit in July 2014. The 
choice of a co-op model of equal shares and 
capital of US$50bn avoids long negotiations 
and future struggles over voting shares, 
although it evidently also limits the size of the 
capital base. The Long Term Vision for BRICS 
report from the Observer Research 
Foundation in New Delhi estimates that the 
announced capital structure could support 
US$9bn per year annual disbursements, 
leveraging total financing of US$45bn per 
year. For comparison, the total non-
concessional disbursements of the World 
Bank and the regional development banks 
(Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe) were 
US$20bn in 2012; their concessional 
disbursements were a further US$39bn.
BRICS members also have national development 
banks which engage in financing projects in 
developing countries. The BRICS Interbank 
Cooperation Mechanism meets annually and 
organises operational cooperation among these 
member banks. The total development financing 
capacity of the BRICS therefore goes well 
beyond the New Development Bank. In 
addition, at the 2013 Durban Summit, the 
Interbank Cooperation Mechanism concluded 
two co-financing agreements: a BRICS 
Multilateral Infrastructure Financing 
Agreement for Africa and a BRICS Multilateral 
Co-operation and Co-Financing Agreement 
for Sustainable Development.
This range of activity and planned expansion 
implies building impressive capacity in 
operational areas. These include professional 
staffing and research, effective business 
models for project preparation and evaluation 
functions, and risk management, along with 
skilful political entrepreneurship for putting 
together complex interregional projects. The 
existence of the national development banks 
and the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism 
provides a pool of experience and capacity on 
which the New Development Bank can draw. 
The launch of the New Development Bank 
will undoubtedly attract international 
attention and require a level of transparency 
necessary to respond to that. The Bank’s policy 
and research agendas will also be keenly 
observed, especially given the ambition to 
draw on the BRICS’ own development 
experiences and to create an intellectual 
framework for thinking about development 
that is different from the World Bank and the 
regional development banks.
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Policy implications
 • Identity: Policymakers from developed countries, particularly those within the 
G7, can most accurately understand the BRICS Summit identity as a group of 
non-G7 countries providing themselves with a forum where they do not have 
to contend for air-time and agenda-setting with Western powers and 
intellectual frameworks, contributing to a larger process of systemic change in 
global governance. At the same time, they are all fully committed to the G20 
Leaders process.
 • Development finance: A BRICS Development Bank is a potentially significant 
milestone with regard to the future of development cooperation. The range of 
activity and planned expansion implies impressive capacity expansion in these 
countries to staff and govern a new multilateral development institution. Here 
the BRICS can draw on two key sources: 
 – First, they can benefit from work being conducted within the G20, which 
is showing the importance of generating a supply of bankable projects 
and a stream of long-term finance as interdependent elements of an 
infrastructure investment system, and the important interdependence also 
between hardware and software in generating sustainable infrastructure. 
 – Second, national development banks within the BRICS, as well as the 
Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, provide a pool of experience and 
capacity on which the New Development Bank can draw. It will 
undoubtedly attract international attention and will also require a level of 
transparency necessary to respond to such attention.
 • Development cooperation: The growth in weight and influence of emerging 
donors, particularly the BRICS, is clear – both politically and intellectually. They 
present viable alternatives to the world of DAC development cooperation. At 
the same time, a common interest in development effectiveness is beginning to 
emerge as Southern providers become more concerned with systemic 
outcomes, long-term sustainability and state fragility. The future development 
cooperation framework will be based on polycentric geopolitics and multiple 
development experiences, differing from previously dominant structures, both 
intellectually and operationally.
 • Research and knowledge-sharing: New interactive research programmes are 
generating the basis for a network of networks linking think tanks and research 
institutes from the full range of rising powers and OECD countries that could 
provide an intellectual motor for such a future development cooperation 
framework in the changing global landscape.
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